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Abstract
Mexican drug traffickers are more than criminals. They are terrorists.
And that's not hyperbole. The tactics, strategy, organization, and even (to
a limited extent) the goals of the Mexican drug cartels are all perfectly
consistent with those of recognized terrorist organizations. Admittedly,
the cartels lack the motivating political or religious ideology most
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terrorist groups display, and some argue this precludes the application of
the "terrorist" label. However, we will show this objection is inclusive at
best. Were the United States government to formally recognize the
Mexican cartels as the terrorists they are—or at least hybrid
organizations that employ terrorist tactics—a more effective range of
options would become available for combating the cartels and curtailing
the violence that todayengulfs the US/Mexico borderlands.
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Introduction
Mexican drug traffickers are more than criminals. They are terrorists. 
And that's not hyperbole. The tactics, strategy, organization, and even (to 
a limited extent) the goals of the Mexican drug cartels are all perfectly 
consistent with those of recognized terrorist organizations. Admittedly, 
the cartels lack the motivating political or religious ideology most terrorist 
groups display, and some argue this precludes the application of the "ter-
rorist" label. However, we will show this objection is inclusive at best. 
Were the United States government to formally recognize the Mexican 
cartels as the terrorists they are—or at least hybrid organizations that 
employ terrorist tactics—a more effective range of options would become 
available for combating the cartels and curtailing the violence that today 
engulfs the US/Mexico borderlands.
Situation on the Ground
Violence along the United States border with Mexico has been the focus of 
political controversy for years. Killings spurred by turf wars and rivalries 
between Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), as well as border 
security concerns post—9/11, have put the US-Mexico border squarely in 
the spotlight. The issues involved can be overwhelming—the trafficking of 
billions of dollars worth of illicit narcotics; the illegal movement into 
Mexico of assault weapons purchased in US border states; human smug-
gling rings bringing special interest aliens1 into the United States; the 
potential for terrorists to enter the United States via the southwest bor-
der; and ultimately, the effect of DTO-related violence that has spilled 
over into US border communities.
1  Special interest aliens, or SIAs, are illegal immigrants from countries the US 
Government deems are of special interest, e.g. Iraq, Syria, Pakistan, etc.
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Border violence statistics are staggering. In 2007, approximately 2,500 
Mexicans lost their lives in DTO-related violence.2 As of July 2008, the 
death toll was 2,000, on track to exceed 4,000 by the end of the year. 
DTO-related deaths in Mexico in the last year and a half exceed the num-
ber of coalition troops killed in Iraq since 2003,3 and the deaths in 2008 
will likely exceed those of 9/114 and the annual loss of life caused by 
narco-terrorism in Colombia.5 The homicide rate in Tijuana in the first 
half of 2008 was eleven times that of Los Angeles during the same period. 
6, 7 The United Nations estimates the illicit narcotics business in Mexico is 
worth at least US$142 billion—11 percent of Mexico's gross domestic 
product.8
As the violence has become pervasive, both the US and Mexican Govern-
ments have taken measures to deal with the problem. As of June 2008, 
the Mexican Government had 27,000 troops deployed to various DTO hot 
spots, out of approximately 240,000 total troops.9 The US Government 
has increased the number of US Border Patrol (USBP) Agents along the 
border, approved the deployment of the National Guard to support the 
USBP, and begun construction of a border fence. US state and local law 
enforcement is working to stop weapons traffickers and human smug-
glers. Yet despite these herculean efforts by both governments, the vio-
lence persists and, in many areas, worsens.
Both the Mexican and US Governments consider Mexican DTOs as orga-
nized crime. This initially seems rational, since DTO structures and oper-
ations clearly mimic those of paradigmatic organized crime in other parts 
of the world. However, some of the tactics, techniques, and procedures 
used by Mexican DTOs, usually through their enforcement arms, extend 
2  Catherine Bremer, "Four people killed in Mexico drug-smuggling area." Reuters, 
May 19, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/
idUSN1954747020080520?pageNumber=2&virtualBrandChannel=0. 
3  Strategic Forecasting, "Mexico Security Memo," July 7, 2008, 
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/mexico_security_memo_july_7_2008. 
4  The current tally places the 9/11 death toll at 2,752.
5  The Colombian Government estimates that approximately 3,000 people are 
killed every year as a result of narco-terrorism.
6  Amy Isackson, "14 Dead in Tijuana Breaks Uneasy Calm," KPBS, July 7, 2008, 
http://www.kpbs.org/news/local;id=12179.
7  L.A. County Murders, http://www.lacountymurders.com/. 
8  The World Factbook, "Mexico," Central Intelligence Agency, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/print/mx.html. 
9  Strategic Forecasting, "Mexico Security Memo," June 2, 2008, 
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/mexico_security_memo_june_2_2008. 
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beyond the traditional activities of groups like the Russian Mafia or the 
Gambino crime family. Mexican DTO enforcers have better weapons and 
better armor than Mexican or US law enforcement. They have similar, 
and often superior, training. Their funding comes from DTOs, which 
means their bankrolls are practically unlimited.
A Failed Approach
Even as it reaches crisis proportions, the violence in Mexico and along the 
US-Mexico border continues to be treated as a criminal problem with 
resources and personnel designed to counter simple lawbreakers. This 
tactic is winning some battles, but losing the overall war—an asymmetric, 
fourth generation war—with US and Mexican law enforcement attempt-
ing to defeat a foe engaging in terrorist, insurgent, and criminal activity at 
will.
A new approach is needed, an approach that can truly defeat DTO vio-
lence in Mexico and along the border. And here's a clue—while Mexican 
DTOs cannot easily be placed in any traditional category, all exhibit char-
acteristics of terrorist, insurgent, as well as criminal organizations. Per-
haps it is time to rethink the way we define Mexican DTOs, and to do so 
with an eye toward giving governments and law enforcement better tools 
to combat the scourge.
Definitions of Terrorism, Narco-terrorism, 
Insurgency, and Organized Crime
Before any new definition or category can be considered, current defini-
tions must be understood.
Terrorism. Unfortunately, there is no universally-accepted definition of 
terrorism. However, there are certain definitional elements that are fairly 
common; namely, the use of violence, the target of violence, and the pur-
pose behind the violence. According to Title 22 of the United States Code, 
Section 2656f(d), the US Government defines terrorism as premeditated, 
politically-motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatants by sub-
national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an 
audience.10 The US Department of Defense (DoD) definition is more spe-
cific, identifying terrorism as the calculated use of unlawful violence or 
threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or to 
intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are gener-
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ally political, religious, or ideological.11 The Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion (FBI) definition varies only slightly from that of the DoD, describing 
terrorism as the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or prop-
erty to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any 
segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.12
Narco-terrorism. The term "narco-terrorism" emerged recently. It was 
probably coined by former Peruvian President Belaunde Terry in 1983 to 
describe terrorist-type attacks against his police forces by members of 
Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path. Then, in 1986, President Ronald 
Reagan spoke of narco-terrorism when referring to links between interna-
tional drug trafficking and terrorism.13 The Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration (DEA) defines a narco-terrorist organization as an organized 
group that is complicit in the activities of drug trafficking in order to fur-
ther, or fund, premeditated, politically-motivated violence perpetrated 
against noncombatant targets with the intention to influence (that is, 
influence a government or group of people).14
10  Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Patterns of Global Terrorism 
2002, US Department of State Publication 11038 (Washington, DC: State 
Department, April 2003), p. 13, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/20177.pdf
11  United States Department of Defense, Office of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publi-
cation 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms (Washington, DC: United States Department of Defense, 12 April 2001—
As amended through 5 June 2003), p. 531, 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf
12  Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit, National Security Divi-
sion, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Terrorism in the United States 1999: 30 
Years of Terrorism—A Special Retrospective Edition, (Washington, DC: United 
States Department of Justice, 1999), p. i, 
http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terror99.pdf
13  Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy. "Narco-Terrorism in Afghanistan." Terrorism Monitor, 
Vol. 2, Issue 6. (Jamestown Foundation, 2004). http://www.jamestown.org/
publications_details.php?volume_id=400&issue_id=2929&article_id=23648 
14  "Narco-Terrorism: International Drug Trafficking and Terrorism—a Dangerous 
Mix." Statement of Steven W. Casteel, Assistant Administrator for Intelligence 
Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, May 20, 2003. 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct052003.html 
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Insurgency. The terms "terrorist" and "insurgent" are commonly used 
interchangeably or incorrectly. According to the US Army's 
counterinsurgency manual, an insurgency is an organized movement 
aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of 
subversion and armed conflict. Stated another way, an insurgency is an 
organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the 
control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, 
or other political authority while increasing insurgent control.15 The goal 
of an insurgency is to challenge the existing government for control of all 
or a portion of the national territory, or force political concessions, for 
example, sharing political power. Insurgencies require the support of a 
portion of the population. Activities of insurgencies and terrorist groups 
often overlap, which is a reason for the confusion between the two. The 
main difference between terrorism and insurgency is that an insurgency 
is a movement, a political effort with a specific aim. Guerrilla warfare and 
terrorism are methods that insurgencies can use, but insurgencies do not 
necessarily use terrorism. Insurgencies do not always target non-
combatants, although many insurgencies expand the accepted definition 
of combatants to include police and security personnel, in addition to the 
military. Terrorists do not discriminate between combatants and non-
combatants; they actually often prefer to target civilians. The targeting of 
civilians by insurgent groups is not that rare. In 1955, the National 
Liberation Front (an Algerian insurgent group) sought to escalate their 
conflict against the French by attacking civilian targets. Of the 123 killed 
in the Philippeville massacre, several were old women and infants.16 In 
September 1969, approximately 2,300 civilians had been unearthed in 
and around the city of Hue in Vietnam. All were executed by the Viet 
Cong during the Tet offensive in 1968.17 Choices like this by insurgent 
groups and the routine practice of targeting the civilian population by 
terrorist groups further blur the distinction. Ultimately, the difference 
between insurgency and terrorism comes down to the intent of the actor, 
at least for the purposes of this discussion. Insurgency movements and 
guerilla forces can adhere to international norms regarding the laws of 
war, but terrorists are by definition conducting crimes under both civil 
and military codes.18
15  US Army, Counterinsurgency (Washington DC: US Department of the Army, 
2006). 
16  Military, "Algerian National Liberation," GlobalSecurity.org, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/algeria.htm. 
17  "The Massacre at Hue," Time, October 31, 1969, 
http://moderntimes.vcdh.virginia.edu/HIUS316/mbase/docs/hue.html. 
18  Terrorism Research, "Differences between Terrorism and Insurgency," 
http://www.terrorism-research.com/insurgency/ 
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Organized crime. Historically, the term "organized crime" brought to 
mind organizations like La Cosa Nostra or the Russian Mafia, and activi-
ties like racketeering, prostitution, and extortion. Today, the face of orga-
nized crime presents itself in a more violent and public fashion, namely 
that of Mexican drug cartels and their enforcers. The FBI defines orga-
nized crime as any group having some manner of a formalized structure 
and whose primary objective is to obtain money through illegal activities. 
Such groups maintain their position through the use of actual or threat-
ened violence, corrupt public officials, graft, or extortion, and generally 
have a significant effect on the people in their locales, region, or coun-
tries.19
The Problem with Definitions. The differences between these defini-
tions are subtle. Threats to national security along our borders as well as 
internationally do not fit neatly into pre-determined classifications. The 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) are a designated for-
eign terrorist organization, yet they have been fighting an insurgency for 
over 40 years. Terrorist groups are constantly evolving their methods and 
their targets. The same is happening with DTOs along the US-Mexico bor-
der. As the movement of drugs has shifted from the Caribbean to Mexico 
and Central America, the situation along the border has changed. No 
longer are petty criminals occupying the majority of USBP's time. Instead, 
as violence levels have increased and DTOs have become more sophisti-
cated, conditions along the border tend toward all-out war. Pigeonholing 
DTOs as organized crime undermines the ultimate goal of effectively com-
bating their threats.
Overview of Mexican DTOs
The Congressional Research Service reports that, although Mexico's car-
tels have existed for some time, they have become increasingly powerful 
in recent years with the demise of the Medellín and Cali cartels in Colom-
bia. Reduction of the cocaine trafficking route through Florida also 
pushed cocaine traffic to Mexico, increasing the role of Mexican cartels in 
the cocaine business. The National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) 
believes Mexican DTOs now dominate the US illicit drug market.20
19  Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Organized Crime Glossary," FBI Public Web-
site, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/orgcrime/glossary.htm 
20  Colleen W. Cook, "Mexico's Drug Cartels." CRS Report for Congress, October 
16, 2007. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34215.pdf 
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Mexican Government data indicate that, as of late 2007, there were seven 
DTOs operating in Mexico.21 However, in the last year, some have formed 
and re-formed alliances, and lost key members and leaders to arrests and 
assassinations. Until recently, three main DTOs controlled most of the 
drug trade in Mexico and Mexican "plazas," or drug trafficking routes into 
the United States: The Arellano-Felix Organization (a.k.a. the AFO or 
Tijuana cartel), the Sinaloa Federation (a.k.a. the Golden Triangle Alli-
ance), and the Gulf cartel. Over the last few months, the Juárez cartel has 
separated itself from the Sinaloa Federation, which means the Mexican 
government now has four major DTOs to deal with.22 The AFO has lost 
several key leaders to arrests in the last few years, and its remnants are 
struggling to retain control of territory and business in Baja California. If 
the AFO goes out of business, the number of major Mexican DTOs will go 
back to three.
Not surprisingly, violence along the US-Mexico border has long been 
associated with drug trafficking. However, law enforcement officials have 
noted a significant escalation in the level of violence in recent years. Much 
of the violence along the Southwest Border is a result of fights between 
the Gulf cartel and the Sinaloa Federation for control of key smuggling 
routes into the United States. The escalation of drug-related violence 
along the border increasingly involves DTO use of violent paramilitary 
enforcement groups. Mexican DTOs use such groups to protect opera-
tions and drug shipments, as well as to target members of rival drug car-
tels and law enforcement officers. Los Zetas, the enforcement arm of the 
Gulf Cartel, may be the most technologically advanced, sophisticated, and 
violent of these paramilitary enforcement groups. Some Los Zetas mem-
bers are former Mexican Special Forces soldiers and maintain expertise in 
heavy weaponry, specialized military tactics, sophisticated communica-
tions equipment, intelligence collection, and countersurveillance tech-
niques.23
21  Cook, CRS Report for Congress, 2007.
22  Strategic Forecasting, "Mexico Security Memo," May 19, 2008, 
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/mexico_security_memo_may_19_2008.
23  US Drug Enforcement Administration, "Southwest Border Region Drug Trans-
portation and Homeland Security Issues," 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/concern/18862/southwest_border.htm#Start. 
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Terrorist-Style Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 
of the Mexican DTOs
Mexican DTOs, through their enforcement groups, routinely engage in 
activities similar or identical to those of designated foreign terrorist orga-
nizations. Below are some recent examples of DTO-related actions that 
reflect definitions of terrorism.
Assassinations. DTO-orchestrated assassinations usually target Mexi-
can law enforcement or members of the local government, although civil-
ians connected to the Mexican drug trade are often targeted as well. DTO 
enforcers target police chiefs, mayors, and other mid-to senior-level gov-
ernment individuals, often with a high rate of success. As many as one or 
two dozen assassinations occur throughout Mexico in any given week. The 
following are just a few examples of assassinations that all occurred in the 
same week in late August 2008.
•   On August 15, 2008, two police officers were wounded in an apparent 
assassination attempt in Puebla, during which gunmen fired more than 
eighty rounds. Some reports indicate the officers were bodyguards for a 
deputy state attorney general.24
•   On August 21, 2008, the bodies of three men presumed to be federal 
agents were discovered in a vehicle along a highway in the State of Mex-
ico. Each had been shot once in the forehead. The same day, a police 
commander in Pabellon de Arteaga, Aguascalientes, died after being 
shot approximately thirty times.25
•   On August 23, 2008, the dead body of a police commander in the State 
of Hidalgo was found in Otumba, Mexico. He had been kidnapped the 
night before.26
•   On August 24, 2008, a police officer in Culiacán, Sinaloa, died after at 
least one gunman armed with an assault rifle shot him multiple 
times.27
24  Strategic Forecasting, "Mexico Security Memo," August 18, 2008, 
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/mexico_security_memo_aug_18_2008. 
25  Strategic Forecasting, August 18, 2008. 
26  Strategic Forecasting, August 18, 2008. 
27  Strategic Forecasting, "Mexico Security Memo," August 25, 2008, 
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/mexico_security_memo_aug_25_2008. 
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Executions. DTOs routinely use grisly executions to intimidate their 
rivals, the government, and the public.
•   On July 7, 2008, Mexican authorities found the bodies of six men in 
Tijuana. The victims had been tortured and shot to death, and the kill-
ers tried to burn the bodies. The previous day, there were six other exe-
cutions in different parts of Tijuana and the day before there were 
another three.28
•   On July 27, 2008, gunmen armed with AK-47 rifles executed two Mex-
ican Federal Investigative Agency (AFI) agents and gravely wounded 
another just after the victims left a Chinese restaurant in the western 
part of Mexicali, Baja California.29
•   On August 9, 2008, the bodies of two unidentified men wrapped in a 
blanket and with signs of torture were discovered near Tijuana. A note 
was found near the bodies that read, "This will happen to those that 
keep working for [Sinaloa cartel associate] El Mayo Zambada."30
•   On August 25, 2008, authorities found the bodies of two unidentified 
men on Bulevar 2000 in Colonia Valle Imperial in Tijuana. One of the 
victims was decapitated.31
•   On August 26, 2008, authorities found three decapitated bodies in an 
empty lot in Colonia Garcia in Tijuana. Three charred human heads 
were found nearby.32
•   On August 28, 2008, Mexican authorities found twelve decapitated 
bodies on the Yucatán Peninsula, but had yet to find the heads. Photos 
of the crime scene showed eleven headless corpses stacked on top of 
one another in a field outside the city of Mérida, the capital of Yucatán. 
A twelfth body was found in a town called Buctzotz, forty-five miles 
28  "Seis ejecutados en Tijuana," Frontera.info, July 7, 2008, 
http://www.frontera.info/EdicionEnLinea/Notas/Noticias/07072008/
313971.aspx. 
29  "Asesinaron a Agentes de la AFI en Mexicali," Tribuna de San Luis, July 27, 
2008, http://www.oem.com.mx/tribunadesanluis/notas/n788418.htm. 
30  Strategic Forecasting, "Mexico Security Memo,"August 11, 2008, 
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/mexico_security_memo_aug_11_2008. 
31  "Aparecen dos ejecutados, uno de ellos decapitado," El Mexicano, August 25, 
2008, 
http://www.el-mexicano.com.mx/nota.aspx?idNota=316836&esSecc=true. 
32  Luis Gerardo Andrade. "Hallan tres decapitados más en Tijuana," La Crónica, 
August 26, 2008, http://www.lacronica.com/EdicionEnLinea/Notas/Noticias/
26082008/323571.aspx. 
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northeast of Mérida. It appeared to be the largest single group of 
beheadings in recent years in Mexico.33
Some analysts say tactics such as beheadings, once unheard of in Mexico's 
drug underworld, are akin to terrorism because part of the goal is to scare 
civilians so that they will press the government to back off.34
Kidnappings. Kidnappings in Mexico jumped almost 40 percent 
between 2004 and 2007, according to official statistics. Police say there 
were 751 kidnappings in Mexico last year, but independent crime research 
institute ICESI says the true number could be above 7,000.35 Tijuana suf-
fers more kidnappings than almost any other city outside Baghdad, 
according to a global security firm that handles ransom negotiations 
south of the border. With the AFO and other smaller Mexican DTOs rav-
aged by arrests and killings, cartel lieutenants have been turning more 
and more to kidnappings to supplement their dwindling drug profits.36 
Between May 2004 and May 2005, there were thirty-five reported abduc-
tions of US citizens in the Southwest Border area. Much larger numbers of 
Mexican citizens have been abducted along the border. From January to 
mid-August 2005, 202 kidnappings occurred in the Mexican state of 
Tamaulipas, the Gulf Cartel's operational center, which includes the cities 
of Matamoros, Nuevo Laredo, and Reynosa. Thirty-four of these abduc-
tions occurred in Nuevo Laredo and involved US citizens who had crossed 
the border. Twenty-three victims were released by their captors, nine vic-
tims remain missing, and two are confirmed dead.37 Abductions are 
occurring in the Phoenix, Arizona, area at the rate of practically one per 
day, and police suspect they have led to killings in which bound and bul-
let-riddled bodies have been found dumped in the desert. Phoenix had 
33  "12 Decapitated Bodies Found in Mexico, Heads Still Missing." FOX News, 
August 29, 2008, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,413183,00.html. 
34  Ken Ellingwood, "Drug War Bodies are Piling Up in Mexico," Los Angeles 
Times, August 30, 2008, http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/front/la-
fg-mexdrugs30-2008aug30,0,4013974.story. 
35  "Over 150,000 March in Mexico Against Crime." Reuters, August 30, 2008, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSN3050065320080831?page-
Number=2&virtualBrandChannel=0. 
36  Richard Marosi, "Tijuana's elite flee to San Diego County to escape kidnappings 
and violence in Mexico." Los Angeles Times, June 7, 2008, 
http://www.latimes.com/news/local/immigration/la-me-exodus7-
2008jun07,0,1699616,full.story. 
37  Statement of Chris Swecker Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division 
Federal Bureau of Investigation Before the US House of Representatives Com-
mittee on Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security 
and the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Claims. 17 Nov 
2005. Online at http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress05/swecker111705.htm 
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more than 340 such kidnappings reported last year,38 but police said the 
real number is higher because many cases go unreported.39
Kidnappers in Mexico are three times more likely to kill their victims than 
are their counterparts in Colombia. About one out of every seven people 
kidnapped in Mexico was killed at the hands of their captors in 2005, 
compared to one out of every twenty-six victims in Colombia, according to 
a report by the Citizen Council for Public Safety, a private-sector think 
tank. While some kidnappers in Mexico may kill their victims to eliminate 
witnesses or because they have botched a kidnapping, others use violence 
selectively.40
Use of High-Powered Assault Weapons. According to Bill Newell, 
the special agent in charge of the Phoenix field division of the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), the DTOs' weapons of 
choice include variants of the AK-47 and AR-15, .50-caliber sniper rifles 
and a Belgian-made pistol called the "cop killer" or "mata policia" because 
of its ability to pierce a bulletproof vest with certain ammunition.41 Arms 
traffickers have left Mexico awash in assault rifles, pistols, telescope sight-
ing devices, grenades, grenade launchers and high-powered ammuni-
tion.42
•   On August 11, 2008, three men driving along a highway in Durango 
died when they were shot by men armed with assault rifles.43
•   On August 18, 2008 in Cuidad Juarez, masked gunmen wielding 
assault rifles shot and killed two brothers. The same day, three men 
died and a woman and her husband were wounded when gunmen 
armed with automatic rifles opened fire during a wedding reception in 
Rosario, Sinaloa state.
38  Kidnappings in Phoenix are not included in southwest border kidnapping data, 
ostensibly because Phoenix is a three-hour drive away from the US-Mexico bor-
der.
39  "Kidnappings cross the border," MSNBC, January 11, 2008, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22614102/page/2/print/1/displaymode/1098/. 
40  "Mexico kidnappings deadliest in Latin America," MSNBC, 20 December 20, 
2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10546934/. 
41  Brian Ross and Richard Esposito, "US Guns Arming Mexican Drug Gangs; Sec-
ond Amendment to Blame?" ABC News, April 22, 2008, 
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/Story?id=4695848&page=1. 
42  Manuel Roig-Franzia, "US Guns Behind Cartel Killings in Mexico," The Wash-
ington Post, October 29, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/con-
tent/article/2007/10/28/AR2007102801654_pf.html. 
43  Strategic Forecasting, August 18, 2008.
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•   On August 24, 2008, a police officer in Culiacán, Sinaloa state, died 
after at least one gunman armed with an assault rifle shot him multiple 
times.44
Fear Mongering. Fear as a result of DTO-related violence has spread 
like wildfire throughout Mexico. Wealthy Mexicans ride in bulletproof 
vehicles, wear protective clothing, and hire bodyguards. Businessmen 
avoid certain restaurants they fear might be frequented by cartel thugs. 
Many Mexicans take special care not to wear anything that might attract 
attention from DTO enforcers—certain clothing, hats, jewelry, etc. Indi-
viduals avoid eye contact if a Hummer or other large SUV pulls alongside 
at a stoplight. Police checkpoints are a cause for concern because the peo-
ple dressed as police officers could be real police, or they could be DTO 
enforcers disguised as police. Women are careful in shunning unwanted 
male attention for fear that they might be carrying weapons they are very 
willing to use. Men are careful about the women they look at for fear they 
might be a wife or girlfriend of someone also willing to use a weapon. 
Some Mexicans are even having microchips inserted in their forearms so 
they can be tracked in case they are kidnapped by drug traffickers.45 Ban-
ners placed in public areas have become a common intimidation tool and 
are often used to threaten violence against individuals. Banners hung 
ostensibly by DTOs in cities across Mexico in late August 2008 were note-
worthy in that part of their message was directed toward civilians, assur-
ing them that the cartels—not the government—control the level of 
violence in the country.46
Similarities to Traditional Terrorism. Violent acts committed by 
DTOs and their enforcers are currently viewed as criminal acts. Yet, most 
of those acts are identical in nature to acts committed by traditional ter-
rorist groups like al-Qaeda, the FARC, and the Provisional Irish Republi-
can Army (IRA), and with similar intentions. DTO enforcers routinely use 
beheadings during executions of their rivals or enemies. Not many can 
forget the videotaped beheading of American businessman Nicholas Berg 
by members of al-Qaeda in Iraq in May 2004. DTOs engage in insurgent-
style tactics against the Mexican military, Mexican and US law enforce-
44  Strategic Forecasting, August 25, 2008.
45  Marc Lacey, "Drug Violence Alters the Flow of Life in Mexico," The New York 
Times, August 30, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/31/world/ameri-
cas/31mexico.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&ref=world. 
46  Strategic Forecasting, "Mexico Security Memo," September 2, 2008, 
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/mexico_security_memo_sept_2_2008. 
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ment, and civilians alike just like the FARC in Colombia. DTOs have suc-
cessfully targeted government officials and law enforcement officers for 
assassination, just like the IRA in the 1970s and 1980s. Most importantly, 
the intention of all these groups is the same—to intimidate the populace 
and change the behavior of a government. The motivations are clearly dif-
ferent for each group, but the effect on the populace is the same.
A Precedent for Calling it Terrorism: United Self-
Defense Forces of Colombia
Although Mexican DTOs, generally through their enforcers, use the same 
tactics, techniques, and procedures as terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and 
Shining Path, they are missing what some might say is the critical compo-
nent—ideology. Mexican DTOs do not wish to remove the Mexican Gov-
ernment and replace it with one of their own. They are not religious 
zealots wishing to convert the Mexican people or the rest of the world. 
They simply want to maximize their profits and keep government and law 
enforcement out of their business. Many in the counterterrorism world 
say this lack of ideology precludes Mexican DTOs and their enforcers 
from even being in the same league as foreign terrorist organizations. 
However, an organization in Colombia provides a different precedent.
Commonly referred to by its Spanish acronym (AUC), the United Self-
Defense Forces of Colombia was an umbrella group formed in 1997 to 
organize loosely affiliated illegal paramilitary groups in Colombia. These 
paramilitaries originally emerged in the 1980s, as Pablo Escobar and 
other drug lords began hiring protection for their territory and operations 
from left-wing Marxist rebels, such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). The AUC 
increasingly discarded its counterguerrilla activities, electing instead to 
involve itself in the illegal drug trade. By 2007, as the result of a large 
demobilization, most of the AUC's centralized military structure had been 
dismantled. Colombia now faces criminal gangs formed by demobilized 
paramilitaries. Unlike the AUC, the new criminal groups make little claim 
to fighting insurgents and are more clearly criminal enterprises focused 
primarily on drug trafficking, other lucrative illicit activities, and influ-
encing local politics to facilitate their criminal ventures. During its hey-
day, AUC operations varied from assassinating suspected insurgent 
supporters to engaging insurgent combat units. As much as 70 percent of 
the paramilitary operational costs were financed with drug-related earn-
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ings, with the rest coming from "donations" from sponsors and govern-
ment corruption.47
Despite never having a political, religious, or ideological goal, routinely 
engaging in violence that was not politically motivated, and not intending 
to influence any particular audience, the AUC was designated as a Foreign 
Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the State Department in 2001.48 
Although the AUC has "demobilized" and morphed into criminal enter-
prises focused on drug trafficking and other illicit activities, the US State 
Department has not removed the AUC's designation as an FTO. Mexican 
DTO enforcers and former AUC paramilitary groups are similar in almost 
every way. DTO enforcers do battle with rival enforcer groups, the Mexi-
can military, and both Mexican and US law enforcement. The AUC did 
battle with left-wing guerrilla groups, the Mexican military, and Mexican 
law enforcement. Mexican DTO enforcers kill thousands of Mexicans 
every year, and the AUC killed, displaced, or kidnapped thousands of 
Colombians every year. Mexican DTO enforcer targets are usually 
involved in the drug trade in Mexico. AUC targets were usually members 
or supporters of left-wing terrorist groups. Innocent civilians have been 
victims of actions by both groups, but are generally considered collateral 
damage and not specifically targeted because they are innocent civilians. 
Yet, the AUC remains a designated FTO, and Mexican DTOs are consid-
ered organized crime groups.
DTO Use of Insurgent Tactics against Mexican 
Government Forces
In early 2008, US counterterrorism sources reported the Gulf cartel real-
ized it was incapable of head-to-head engagements with the Mexican mil-
itary and federal police, but felt that engaging in insurgent-style tactics 
would give it an advantage. Mexican DTOs have actually used these tac-
tics for some time, and have demonstrated a strong capability to conduct 
ambushes and hit-and-run attacks against convoys, highway checkpoints, 
and police and military installations.49 Over the last thirteen months, the 
army and federal police task forces have used both counter-insurgency 
47  US State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism (April 2008), 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/105904.pdf 
48  According to US State Department records, the Administration designated the 
AUC as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO)on September 10, 2001, in con-
sultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury. 
49  Strategic Forecasting, "Mexico: A Shift in Cartel Tactics?" January 15, 2008, 
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/mexico_shift_cartel_tactics. 
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warfare tactics and law enforcement techniques in counter-cartel opera-
tions. At times, the counter-insurgency tactics have taken precedence 
over traditional police-type anti-crime measures.50
The Newest Generation of Organized Crime
According to Strategic Forecasting (Stratfor), what distinguishes Mexican 
DTOs from "traditional" terrorist and revolutionary groups is their under-
lying goal of making money.51 However, part of what makes the problem 
endemic is that DTOs make communities and many non-cartel-related 
individuals rich through their money-laundering activities. Many are 
happy to launder the cartels' millions—which account for an economic 
boom in Culiacán, Mexico, replete with new Hummer dealerships, and 
casinos and nightclubs where women sport diamond-encrusted finger-
nails. Laundering sustains a network of drug-tainted businesses, from 
cattle ranches to currency-exchange houses to motels.52
Organized crime problems in Mexico are similar to cases past, in which 
criminal elements become factionalized. The battles that are taking place 
are largely the result of fighting among the organized crime groups, rather 
than DTOs simply fighting the Mexican Government. Organized crime 
tends to become more conservative as it grows and gets more established. 
Mexican DTOs could attempt to rein in more violent actors as a way of 
assuring their operations, similar to the actions of the American Mafia. 
Stratfor poses the crucial question of whether the Mexican DTOs will go 
in the direction of the American model or Colombian model of organized 
crime. Each route would have a very different impact on the state of 
affairs in Mexico. The American model could lead to an increase in stabil-
ity and an overall decrease in violence, whereas the Colombian model—a 
hybrid of organized crime and insurgency—could lead to increased vio-
lence and even more problems for the Mexican Government.53
50  Austin Bay, "Mexico's Cartel War," The Washington Times, January 18, 2008, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/jan/18/mexicos-cartel-war/. 
51  Strategic Forecasting, "The Big Business of Organized Crime in Mexico," Febru-
ary 13, 2008, 
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/big_business_organized_crime_mexico. 
52  Tim Padgett and Ioan Grillo, "Mexico's Cocaine Capital," TIME, August 14, 
2008, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1832854-2,00.html. 
53  Strategic Forecasting, February 13, 2008.
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Reasons for a New Definition
The practical argument for redefining Mexican DTOs as terrorist organi-
zations is that resources could then be allocated differently and more 
effectively. Today, the brunt of the battle against Mexican DTOs is borne 
by law enforcement. In the United States, county and municipal law 
enforcement is funded locally. Some receive Homeland Security dollars, 
but those are often earmarked for counterterrorism. Many US law 
enforcement agencies along the border do not have the money to hire 
more officers and purchase the weapons and protective equipment neces-
sary to combat DTO enforcers along the border. The US Army has been 
prohibited from providing much assistance due the Posse Comitatus Act 
of 1878, which has historically forbidden the military from engaging in 
civilian law enforcement activity. However, recent changes to the Act, 
namely Section 1076 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization 
Act,54 are redefining the Army's role. The President can now employ the 
armed forces within the United States during natural disasters, public 
emergencies, and terrorist attacks. More importantly, those forces can be 
used when "domestic violence has occurred to such an extent that the 
constituted authorities of the State or possession are incapable of main-
taining public order." Should DTOs take their activities along the border 
to the next level—meaning the use of terrorist tactics against US law 
enforcement officers that are incapable of responding—the Federal Gov-
ernment can choose to legally address that threat with the US military.
A new definition may open up avenues for providing assistance to Mexico 
in a fashion that is more diplomatically acceptable. Calling Mexican DTOs 
terrorist organizations would also allow Mexico and the United States to 
engage in more aggressive actions against DTOs that could not be used 
against criminal organizations. While it is ultimately up to the Mexican 
Government to decide how to handle DTO violence, redefining the prob-
lem could provide a bigger selection of tools than currently available. A 
new definition might also ameliorate some jurisdictional issues between 
law enforcement agencies on both sides of the border, as well as commu-
nication issues between the United States and Mexico, because the prob-
lem would be handled at the federal level.
DTOs operate along the border with impunity. The escalation of violence 
over the past few years is indicative of both their sophistication and the 
incapability of the United States and Mexico to effectively halt their oper-
ations. The Global War on Terrorism allows the full catalogue of Ameri-
can resources to be employed. If the War on Drugs is to move past its 
54  Also known as Public Law 109–364.
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current stagnation, DTOs must be included with the likes of al-Qaeda, the 
FARC, and Hizballah. The redefinition of DTOs as terrorist organizations 
takes into account all aspects of their activity: the use of terrorist tactics; 
the use of proceeds from the production, sale, and distribution of narcot-
ics to fund violent activity; the use of insurgent tactics against the Mexi-
can Government, military, and law enforcement; and the use of organized 
crime group structure and business practices. While Shakespeare said a 
rose by any other name would smell as sweet, a Mexican DTO with a dif-
ferent name could mean a real change in the war on drug cartels. It could 
open up new opportunities for governments to finally end the DTOs' reign 
of terror throughout Mexico and along the US border.
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